INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss the impact of the crisis of 1790s on the commercial world of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata. It will focus on the Anchorena family as representative members of an important economic and social sector of La Plata. The 1790s, throughout the Hispanic world, were part of a larger period of growing crises , the crisis of the Spanish colonial system. Using the Anchorenas as a case study, this research attempts to show different aspects of this era in the most southern part of the Spanish Empire as well as the crisis' specific significance for a particular group of Buenos Aires' merchants.
1 The Anchorenas perceived the 1790s as an all-embracing crisis. The importance of the crisis in the late 18th century consisted in its total and irrevocable nature. "
The impact of the French Revolution lead to dramatic and decisive change for Spain and its empire. With the death of the most competent of the Spanish Bourbons, Charles III, began one of the most remarkable chapters of Spanish history, a chapter which would end in Napoleon's occupation of Spain and the beginning of the Spanish-American revolutions. A decline in all aspects in the mother-country was reflected in the crisis of the Spanish colonial system. Under the reign of Charles IV and his prime minister Godoy, Spain no longer was able to maintain its role as an economic and political metropolis for its colonies. From 1793 up to 1808 Spain waged in changing alliances an almost permanent war with France (1793 France ( -1795 1808 -1813 ), Great Britain (1796 -1802 1804 -1808 ), and Portugal (1801 1807) . The military conflicts sometimes affected Spain's territory, usually its coasts. Little by little the Spanish navy perished (St. Vicente 1797; Trafalgar 1805). Without doubt, Spain's participation in the European wars reflected its political weakness and its lasting dependence on France and England, both struggling for the predominance in the Old World. To be sure, the decline of Spanish political and military power also became manifest in the New World itself, as the losses of Santo Domingo (1795), Trinidad (1797), and Louisiana (1803) show.
Spain's colonial crisis also meant deep economic confusion and difficulties within its empire. During wartimes, the enemy's navy, corsairs, and pirates separated and isolated the colonies' economy and communication from its mother-country. Mutual trade on both sides of the Atlantic was ruined. The so called free trade system (comercio libre), put into force in 1778 in La Plata, now was left without realistic foundation. Due to this fact, from 1791 the Spanish authorities reacted by opening La Plata's market to foreign merchants. At the turn of the century, another focus of economic troubles became evident: Upper Peru's silver mines faced intense production problems because of the decreased supply of Spanish mercury. As a result, the Viceroyalty's economic motor generated visible social tensions.
The crisis of the Spanish colonial system was reflected in nearly all of its areas. In fact, the late 18th century saw a growing uncertainty toward traditional Hispanic political, social, and cultural notions. Attentive observers of their worlds in Spain and the Río de la Plata became alarmed by the state's and individual's changing attitudes and behavior. Indeed, longtime inherited political, cultural, moral and religious fundamental truths began to be questioned as a result of the advancing Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, revolutions in France and Haiti, and Spain's own decline. New ideological currents penetrated the Spanish Empire and the members of its upper stratum had to deal with them. Even if they could not escape the confrontation with a new ideological spirit, they did not all react in the same way. Some of the more progressive minded welcomed and enthusiastically embraced the new thinking. Other members of the upper class with a more conservative ideology and mentality, including the Anchorenas, considered the new ideas as dangerous and confusing. Because they observed behind Spain's general crisis a moral decline of European society, they stuck to their traditional convictions.
This article focuses on a family whose name is well known in Argentine history and in the historiography of the Río de la Plata. If it is possible to link the Anchorenas to Argentine politics for several generations, they also can be considered a classic example of a familiy whose rise into the nineteenth-century landed oligarchy was based upon eighteenth-century immigration followed by a successful merchant career. Due to the "mythical character" of the Anchorenas many historians writing on Argentina frequently mention them. Nonetheless, little attention has been given to the fortune of the first generation of the Anchorenas in La Plata.
2 A rich documentation reflects both the formation of the family's original fortune and the crisis of the Spanish Empire in the Río de la Plata. The correspondence which Juan Esteban de Anchorena maintained with the commercial agents of his merchant house is a part of a large collection of documents 3 which covers a whole century of Argentine history. The first records which can be found, date from soon after the arrival of Juan Esteban de Anchorena at Buenos Aires in mid-eighteenth century. 4 Most of the existant letters were written to Juan Esteban de Anchorena by his agents and his oldest son, Juan José Cristóbal. As a result, the article will not only focus on the Anchorenas but as well on the merchants closely connected to their trading house. Another historical source integrated are the records of the consulado of Buenos Aires. 5 This paper concentrates on the primary sources.
Juan Esteban de Anchorena, was descended from a Basque family. He was bom in Pamplona (February 1734) the third son of Domingo de Anchorena Elia and Juana Fermina de Zundueta. A few years later they moved together with their four children to the village of Berrotea in the valley of Baztán (Navarra). Juan Esteban passed his youth in Spain in rather humble conditions. He arrived in Buenos Aires in 1751. 6 Anchorena shared his regional and social background with many young Spaniards who tried to make their fortune as merchants in Buenos Aires. Like other Spanish newcomers at La Plata, Juan Esteban de Anchorena possessed the talent, persistence, and luck to achieve an economic and social advancement within a relatively short time. He started his career as an employee in one of the existing porteño merchant houses, but by 1760 he already was traveling for his own business to Córdoba and Santa Fé. In the mid 1760s he worked as an comerciante minorista in trading activities with the merchant Miguel de Learte y Zegama of Cordoba, and in 1767 he registered as a pulpero in Buenos Aires. During the late sixties and early seventies he undertook several journeys to the interior (Salta, Jujuy) and Upper Peru (Potosí, Oruro, Chuquisaca), he extended his trade up to Lima and the Peruvian Pacific coast (Arica). His trade was based on domestic and European goods. By 1773 he had achieved an impressive fortune of 78.098 pesos.
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Marriage often contributed to the increasing economic fortune of successful colonial merchants. In 1775 Anchorena married Romana Josefa López de Anaya y Gámiz de las Cuevas. Although Anchorena's bride contributed almost nothing to the couple's fortune, she probably belonged to one of the several impoverished, but nevertheless old and respected families of Buenos Aires. Even if Romana Josefa did not descend from an economical powerful family she helped her husband to consolidate his prestige by extending his social and economic network. Juan Esteban was 41 years, Romana Josefa was only 21. Only three of the couple's seven children survived infancy (Juan José Cristóbal, 1780; Tomás Manuel, 1783; Nicolás Mariano, 1785) . From 1779 the family lived in their own house close to the "most successful" merchants in one of the most distinguished quarters of Buenos Aires.
8
Bureaucratic offices were disputed among merchants within the late colonial society. Juan Esteban de Anchorena held various local offices. Beginning 1776 he served as an alférez real of the milicias de caballería lugareñas and in 1781 he was promoted to its second in command. In 1785, as a consequence of his growing economic and social importance, the porteño merchants elected Anchorena to a group of 15 representatives who lobbied for a consulado. Desirous of improving his weakened health and engaging in business, Anchorena traveled to his native country in mid 1786, returning to the Rio de la Plata in early 1788, Although he had been exempted in 1787 from all offices within the town council, in 1789 the cabildo of Buenos Aires invested him with the office of the diputado del Ramo de Policía. When, in 1794, the consulado was finally established in Buenos Aires, Anchorena became its first consul. As such he served for three years, and then he represented Buenos Aires' trade as a regular member of the consulado until 1799. Juan José Cristobal de Anchorena, the oldest son of the family, was educated at the Real Colegio de San Carlos and probably received his commercial formation at his father's trading house. In 1798, at the age of eighteen, Juan José Cristobal left his native town to undertake his first trading work. He remained four years in Potosí where on behalf of his father he became involved in various commercial activities. Thus, Juan José Cristóbal de Anchorena, who traveled to Spain as well in the early nineteenth century, shared the pattern of his career with the majority of the creole merchants of Buenos Aires."
Because of the trade's longtime economic importance for Buenos Aires, its merchants like the Anchorenas had always played an essential role in porteño society. The wholesale merchants (comerciantes mayoristas) who traded goods over large distances between the Old and New World and within South America belonged, in a city with almost no titled-nobility, to the most distinguished social groups of the city. The growing size of the merchant group was one indication of La Plata's enormous economic dynamism during the eighteenth century. In 1736 Buenos Aires counted 20 comerciantes mayoristas, their number almost tripled by 1756; the size of the merchant group in 1778 reached 168. By 1798 the number of comerciantes mayoristas rose to 204. Thus during the first twenty years after the introduction of the comercio libre, for the first time during the eighteenth century, the commercial sector's expansion slowed. Moreover, a commercial almanac of Madrid in 1802, estimates the size of the porteño merchant group at only 138. Even if one regards this number as probably too small, it certainly marks a downward trend for the end of the century and the following decade. In fact, the decrease of Buenos Aires' commercial sector was a true reflection of the crisis of the 1790s and its "high level of economical instability and insecurity".
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Historians frequently maintain that the merchants of Buenos Aires, including the Anchorenas and other high ranking comerciantes mayoristas, played a predominant role as intermediary traders involved in a "passive trade". 13 To be sure, to some extent it is justified to describe the porteño merchant in geographical and economical terms as an intermediary trader linking the South-American and European markets. Many important merchants, including the Anchorenas, displayed a strong economic orientation toward Spain. But in no way the economic operations of the comerciantes mayoristas of Buenos Aires should be reduced to mere commission activities. Porteño merchants were endowed with their own capital which they invested in an independent trade. They worked on their own account and their own risk, they imported and exported, they had free access to the Spanish market, and even sometimes they were equipped with their own ships. 15 "Se trata, en muchos casos, de meros consignatorios de casas españolas. Los Anchorena, Alzaga, Santa Coloma, Matheu, Larrea, que provienen del norte de España, reúnen una apreciable riqueza mediante el apacible oficio de intermediarios comerciales entre la Península y el Río de la Plata", Carlos S. Assadourian et. al., Argentina: De la conquista a la independencia (Buenos Aires 1986), p. 315. See also T. Halperín Donghi: Revolución y guerra, ρ, 42: "la mayor parte de los mercaderes porteños son consignatorios de casas españoles (...). Pero aun quienes no se reducen a actuar como agentes de comerciantes peninsulares se limitan a unas operaciones sin misterio ni riesgo: basta hojear la correspondencia de Anchorena para advertir hasta qué punto su papel se limita al de un intermediario entre la península y el hinterland cada vez más amplio".
14 "The vast majority of porteño merchants were not factors or agents of Cádiz-based firms", S. Madrid, 8.[VIII] . 1789, AGN, VII, 7-4-1-2 "En Francia hay muchas y grandes novedades: de sus resultas han ahorcado al Ministro de Hacienda y su hijo, con otros personajes de mucho carácter: han asolado la bastilla.. .son muchos los robos y desgracias que se experimentan, esperando ahorquen muchos, y entre él los algunos Principes de la sangre...". El Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 2.VIII. 1791, AGN, VII, 7-4-1-3: "Siguen las turbaciones de la Francia, y tenemos en nuestro Reino infinidad de eclesiásticos que han abandonado su patria, y ésta ya se ha declarado República, teniendo a su soberano aprisionado y formándole causa como a un hombre particular. Dios los alumbre, y los llame a sí", and El Conde de las Cinco Tones to J.E, de Anchorena, Cádiz, 24.X.1792, AGN, VII, 7-4 -1-3. For the poem, see "Appendix".
17 See R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 5.X.1790, AGN, VII, 7-4-1-2: "La Irlanda se ha sublevado, y tiene puestos sobre las armas 50.000 hombres, quiere la libertad a imitación de la Francia.. .supongo que de esta misma enfermedad adolece la Inglaterra, y también la España". R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.XII.1791, AGN, VII, 7-4-1-2 "En el Guarico se han levantado los Negros contra sus amos quemándoles las casas, tierras de labor.. .lo cierto es que la Francia sigue con su enfermedad contagiosa..."; and J.E. de Anchorena to J.J.C, de Anchorena, Buenos Aires, 26.V11.I798, AGN, VII, to reopen the door of war with Great Britain. The first news sent to Anchorena in early 1793 was characterized by the conviction that the great European coalition soon would overpower France. The murderers of the French King would be defeated by mid 1793. But expectations were based on a general misinterpretation of the reality. On the contrary, French troops invaded north-eastern Spain, including Anchorena's native region. The merchants became alarmed by the excessive costs of the war and increasingly nervous by the fierce defense of the French Republic. While the position of the coalition weakened, the merchants' aversion for France grew. In mid 1794, Gómez' last hope was God. 20 See El Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 9.V.1795, AGN, VII, 7-4-4-4. F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Córdoba, 15.IX.1795, AGN, VII, 7-4 -3-1: ".. .siempre según veo las cosas, me parece lo mejor se haga efectuado la paz, o se efectúe cuanto antes, porque a lo largo tal vez quedaremos peor, como me persuade desde que los Franceses quitaron la vida a su legítimo señor por lo que son muchos, y han de pelear hasta el fin, a la desesperada, y más si como dicen tienen poco qué comer, que sólo Dios nuestro Señor los puede aniquilar". Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, 3.IV.1795, AGN, VII, 7-4-4-4: ".. .a nosotros nos conviene que ambos marinas [la francesa e inglesa] se arruinasen enteramente: Y vivimos con fundados recelos de que no ha de parar mucho tiempo sin que tengamos guerra con los Ingleses pues se están portando con los procedes más altaneros, y provocativos e indignos con nosotros". F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Córdoba, 7.XII.1795, AGN, VII, 7-4-3-1: ".. .no hay duda que la paz siempre suena bien, pero el sentido de reconocimiento de República, que es lo que han querido después de tantas atrocidas, incomoda [...] pero lo que más me atormenta es la Religión, y más por lo inmediato, que de ésto no se habla nada, pero según los antecedentes a buen librar quedará para que cada uno siga la ley que quisiere, que será un dolor...". 
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During the late 1790s, the desire for a general European peace grew constantly among the merchants whose commercial activitiesas this article will show -were intensely affected by the war. This desire became so strong that they wished France's victory at any See F.A. Diaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Santa Cathalina, 14.1.1796, AGN, VII, 7-4-3 -1 : ".. .por lo que hace a la Religión Católica en la Francia también veo algunos puntos de buena esperanza... Dios sobretodo". And F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Santa Cathalina, 15.IX.1796, AGN, VII, 7-4-3-1: "...en fin los franceses, el que murió, murió, y aunque queden destrozados pero van saliendo con la suya". France, following Gómez, would aspire to alliance with Spain tabreak up England's coalition and to "hacer la forzosa a Portugal... En fin, no sabemos en qué pararán estas misas, porque todo está malo, y anda muy revuelto"; R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.VII1.1796, AGN, VII, 7-4-1-2. 22 See Conde de las Cinco Torres to Juan E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 2.VIII. 1796, AGN, VII, 7-4-4-4. R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.X.1796, AGN, VII, 7-4-1 -2: ".. .en fin, todo es miseria, y lamentos, y creo durer estos por largo tiempo". F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Santa Cathalina, 14.11.1797, AGN, VII, 7-4-3-1. Joaquín de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.1V. 1797, AGN, VII, 7-4-3-2: ".. .España siempre pagará el pato, porque son muy grandes nuestros pecados, y la Francia será la que hará negocio". F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Córdoba, 15.VIII. 1797, AGN, VII, 7-4-3-1: "Los ingleses siempre me persuado se costen en la guerra con los españoles, y quiera Dios no nos visiten por acá...". J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.1.1798, AGN, Vil, 7-4-3-2; and J.E. de Anchorena to J.J.C, de Anchorena, Buenos Aires, 26.VII.1798, AGN, Vit, 7-4-2-6. cost. Even if they detested the French revolutionist ideas, Napoleon now should vanquish Great Britain. But again, the merchants' hope proved to be unrealistic. In May 1799, Obregon Zevallos could only denounce the "sad situation" of Spain and Europe. The world had become incomprehensible, and the last hope left was again God. 23
MILITARY DISASTER AND HUMILATION
For Spain and its colonies, the 1790s were a decade of military disaster and humilation which served as a prelude to the collapse of the Spanish Empire in the early nineteenth century. The war with revolutionary France became the first great public demonstration of Spain's weak military situation. Planned as a triumphal revenge of Louis XVI, the war turned into a bloody defense of Spanish territory. Among Anchorena's agents, the initial enthusiasm turned into disillusion and bewilderment. Like the northern parts of Catalonia, Navarra was greatly affected by the French invasion. Juan Esteban de Anchorena was told by his brother that French troops had entered the valley of Baztán. As a result of the war against France, one finds comments reflecting disillusionment and annoyance toward the Spanish army in Anchorena's correspondence. Spanish merchants and Anchorena's relatives in particular were indignant about their nation's regular troops. Some months after the war, Anchorena's sister complained bitterly of the generals' conduct: ".. .it became apparent that the French didn't want to enter but that our generals hoped for the invasion of the French, some of the Spanish Generals have acquired great prestige, [although] whereever they set foot they were defeated,.. .thus we are all pleased that these people have gone". The navy completed the negative picture of Spain's military power. The battle of St. Vicente in 1797 was only the beginning of the navy's ruin a decade later. Again, the merchants especially condemned the high ranking admirality.
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Spain's inability to fulfill its military role as a world power was realized by Juan Esteban de Anchorena and his agents. The crown's passivity shown toward English and Russian activities in 1789, the loss of Spanish-ruled Santo Domingo in 1795, and the British conquest of Trinidad in 1797 put into question the metropolis' ability to secure the integrity of its American colonies. 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE "COMERCIO LIBRE"
Europe's political crisis combined with the weakness of the Spanish military strongly affected the Hispanic Atlantic trade. For the majority of the porteño merchants including Anchorena, a successful domestic trade in the Río de la Plata depended on an intact and exclusive Hispanic overseas trade. Anchorena's economic advancement was founded on his trade with the mother-country, and in particular with Cádiz. Thus the economic implications of the European wars during the 1790s were felt by Anchorena and his agents on both sides of the Atlantic. The depression of the Atlantic trade meant at the same time a fundamental crisis of the Spanish trading system. The 1790s produced the collapse of the comercio libre. Because of an interrupted Hispanic trade, the crown legalized the slave trade in La Plata (comercio de negros, 1791), the trade with Brazil and the Caribbean Islands (comercio con colonias extranjeras, 1795), and the trade with those nations not at war with England (comercio de neutrales, 1797). 26 As a result, non-Hispanic merchants and goods arrived in Buenos Aires in a direct and legal way by-passing Spain and a large part of the porteño commercial sector.
Already during the late 1780s one can observe a depression of the overseas trade. In February 1789, El Conde de las Cinco Torres complained about the deteriorating situation of Cádiz' commerce.
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In fact, taking a closer look at the volume of legal trade between the Río de la Plata and Cádiz, one can see a sharp decline in 1789/90 compared to 1784 and 1785. The large volume of the general Hispanic Atlantic trade during the two years following the peace-treaty of Versailles (1783) is not only explained by a pentup demand after the North-American war of Independence; it also shows a problematic pattern eventually repeated during the 1790s. The end of the North-American war of Independence, in which Spain had supported the former Anglo-American colonies against England, produced an "over-reaction" of the Spanish and SpanishAmerican markets. As a result, supply and demand, and stability were strongly affected.
28 Anchorena and his agents consequently faced abrupt fluctuations in prices, surfeited markets, a general shortage of capital, miscalculations, bad speculations, and bankruptcies on both sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, they deplored the strong foreign competition, the increasing use of credit, and the lack of its control. 27 "La infelicidad en que se halla ese comercio es bien notoria en este, y de élla se verifican aquí diarias resultas en repetidísimas quiebras, y éstas verificadas con tan mala fe que si no se toma providencia, habiendo algunos ejemplares, llegaría a perderse enteramente la confianza en este comercio", El Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. To be sure, Anchorena's basic economic problems did not just rest on the consequences of a trading boom. They already were caused by the comercio libre of 1778. Indeed, it was the Spanish free trade system, or at least its reality in the late 1780s, which threatened the success of Anchorena's business activities. Anchorena's career was founded on the ability of a relatively small commercial sector to control the profits of the imported merchandise by controling its volume. At the end of the 1780s, the porteño merchants traditionally engaged in the trade with the mother-country had lost this kind of control. In mid 1789, Anchorena supported without doubt the statement of a large group of Buenos Aires ' merchants directed to Viceroy Loreto blaming the free trade system for the disastrous economic situation. 30 Arguing for a quantitative limitation of the trade they sought to regain the former commercial stability and to restore their former monopolistic position. 31 They tried to influence the King's representative at Buenos AGN, VII, 7-4-1-5: "...nosotros en esta nos vemos perplejos en nuestros negocios sin saber cómo acertar, aunque no sea sino es para costear el año, y asi no vemos senda por donde poder dirigirle que no sea segura la pérdida, y dudosa la ganancia...; .. .no tenemos nada de nuevo que observarle de altas y bajas de géneros en general ni en particular, pues continuamente los fabricantes extranjeros nos están metiendo por los ojos sus mercaderías". A. de Arrivillaga to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 4.VIIÍ.I789, AGN, VII, 7-4-1-2: "...digo que la enfermedad es universal asi en toda la Europa como en la América, todo dimana de la mucha facilidad en los fiados". Since 1783 the credit volume of the commerce had been increased significantly, see Eduardo Saguier, "Las crisis de circulación y la lucha contra el monopolio comercial español en los orígenes de la revolución de independencia. El caso de Buenos Aires en el siglo XVIII": Revista Complutense de Historia de América, 19 (Madrid 1993), p. 164. 30 ".. .vemos arruinarse unas casas tras otras; profugar unos, quebrar otros, no pagar los más, malbaratarse los géneros, y últimamente irse debilitando el comercio en tales términos que si no se meditan y planifican con oportunidad los remedios, llegará a ser ruinosa a impulsos de la misma agradable abundancia y perspectiva que trae consigo el comercio libre", Facultad exports of 1785, a decline of 80% will be noted.
34 Anchorena, strongly dependent on the import of efectos de Castilla, was greatly effected.
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To a certain degree, as it will be demonstrated later, his economic problems were self-made. Anchorena was unwilling to benefit from the growing export of La Plata's domestic products. The effects of Spain's war against Great Britain are shown by the revenues of the avería, a 0.5% duty imposed by the consulado of Buenos Aires on all goods legally entering or leaving La Plata. The revenues declined during the war with England to an annual average of only 21.700 pesos compared to 35.000 pesos from mid 1794 to mid 1796.
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For Anchorena, perhaps the most troublesome economic aspect of the 1790s was the unpredictability of his business affairs. The sudden and rapid succession of war and peace, the continuing capture of Spanish trading vessels, and the repeated blockade of Cádiz created a general instability. It was a period when the spread of rumors could produce a fortune or a crash. It was a time when merchants needed a keen sense of smell. It was an era when the economy of the metropolis through its war expenses, its constant shortage of capital, its permanent emission of bonds (vales reales), and its consequent inflation seemed to be ruined. During the 1790s, Anchorena and his agents gradually lost confidence in the crown's economic policy. 
THE CRISIS OF THE INTERNAL TRADE
For the South-American wholesale merchants, the Atlantic trade with Spain was complemented by the internal trade of the Río de la Plata. The commerce with the efectos de Castilla could only be successful if they were sold in the viceroyalty's interior. The profits of the porteño merchants had been founded on their ability to control the volume of the imported merchandise and on its consequent stability. Due to their monopoly, the merchants of Buenos Aires attracted a considerable part of the capital circulating in the viceroyalty. Upper Peru with its mining center Potosí was of crucial importance. The trade of Anchorena and his agents was finally based upon their supply of silver. Furthermore, the trading system of Anchorena and a large sector of porteño merchants depended both on Spain's commercial primacy and on their access and control over the Upper Peruvian silver.
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Generally speaking, the internal trade of the viceroyalty was stricken during the 1790s by problems similar to those facing the Atlantic trade. The commerce of the interior experienced, in the late 1780s and early 1790s, the consequences of the boom which had followed the contos reales de mi orden a La Corana, y me alegro no hubiese Vd. despachado nada de su cuenta como veterano en lo que maliciaba, y le salió cierto". Spain started to issue its vales reales in the 1780s; until the end of the century the crown's paper-money reached a nominal value of 1.759.639. . .todos son arbitrios en nuestra Corte imponiéndonos nuevos contribuciones: ahora ha salido una bastante crecida sobre criados, muías, caballos, y coches; y además se dice que está para salir el decreto para que de todos los caudales que vengan de América para particulares, tomará S.M. la mitad, y lo entregará en vales reales con que vea Vd. que buena era la cosa, y por lo que no conviene hacer venir por ahora los pesos que cada uno tiene en América, a más del riesgo de los enemigos". 3 " T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y guerra, p. 49. -Without doubt the domestic products (efectos de la tierra) formed the bulk of Potosi's total trade. Yet, the trade with efectos de Castilla was of essential significance to the Upper Peruvian economy, In 1793, it was a group of 43 merchants who contributed about 50% to Market of Potosi's alcabala-revenues by the sale of imported merchandise; E. Tandeter, The Market of Potosí, pp. 6-8, North-American war of independence. As in the mother-country, the economic overreaction after 1783 led to surfeited markets, overstocked stores, and ruined retail traders. 39 The few transactions realized were made on the basis of credit. In May 1790, Juan Esteban de Anchorena commented on the difficult situation of the internal trade: If Europe does not realize the decline of the American trade, then "it must suffer because in America everything is piling up". Once they ran into financial problems, merchants were forced to sell goods below their value. At the same time, clients were unable to pay. According to letters received from Anchorena's agents in the interior, the disastrous situation did not improve. In April 1793, Salta's commerce was close to "total ruin", according to Saravia. A few months later, his description from Potosí was drawn in the same dark colors, To be sure, the crisis of the internal trade continued.
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Evidently, the merchants could not perceive any change of the economic situation for the next years. After the end of the war with France (1795), a new wave of imported merchandise entered the Río de la Plata via Spain. 41 Again, stocks were oversupplied, prices decreased, and capital became scarce. From Potosí, a frustrated Obregon Zevallos reported the constant stagnation of the Upper Peruvian trade to Anchorena. According to another letter from Obregon Zevallos of January 1798, the crisis affected the entire region and its whole population. During the 1790s, Anchorena and his agents no longer profited from the internal trade. They and their fellow merchants who were oriented toward Spain lost control of trade volume. Driven by their ambition to regain a limited, stable, and monopolistic trade, they started to look for a remedy. Thus they counted on the wars. They had learned that war would lead to the interruption of the Atlantic trade, choking off importation of European goods. As a result, an increasing demand and a growing volume of internal capital would revive business, strengthen the consumer's spending power, and decrease their overstock. Finally, they would recover their traditional profit margin and eventually restore their lucrative control over supply and demand. But these hopes soon proved to be unrealistic. Despite the "great revolution of Europe" and its long-lasting war, there was no shortage of goods. A letter of Obregón Zevallos reflects this hope within the merchant community before the outbreak of Spain's war with England in 1796. Nonetheless, Obregón Zevallos himself did not cherish many illusions believing that even if the war was to take place, there would be no greater demand.
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Obregón Zevallos' letter explains why the merchants no longer expected to receive benefits from a European war. Even if the war reduced or interrupted trade with Spain, the viceroyalty was still swamped by European goods which had entered through Buenos Aires and the Pacific coast. Indeed, a growing number of foreign ships and an increasing volume of foreign merchandise had marked La Plata's commerce since the crown's liberalization of the trade system in 1791, 1795, and 1797. At the same time, English and North-American trading vessels supplied the South-American economy with European and "Chinese" goods by sailing to Arica, Arequipa, or any other place at the Pacific coast. As a matter of fact, the 1790s with its European wars, its collapse of the Hispanic Atlantic trade, and its commercial liberalization in the Río de la Plata had led to the ruin of Anchorena's internal trade and his traditional trading strategy. No wonder that Juan José Cristóbal de Anchorena, since 1798 a direct observer of the Upper 
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A study of Anchorena's correspondence underlines the impact of the European wars on Río de la Plata's internal trade. It demonstrates the merchants' miscalculations following the sudden succession of war and peace, and reveals furthermore that the mere rumor of peace or war was sufficent to hinder a normal commercial development. At the end of the century, the merchants again were positing their commercial activities upon the war factor. It was the "hope" of a lasting European conflict which led Ezcurra to engage in business. And it was the same thinking which nourished Obregón Zevallos' expectation to pull off a good deal with poor merchandise. But to be sure, oriented toward Spain's commercial exclusiveness within the international framework and dependant on their own trading monopoly within the Río de la Plata, the interruption of the Hispanic overseas trade could not help in the long run. Moreover, at the tum of the century another effect of Spain's crisis became evident: the decline of Potosi's silver mines. The lack of supply of Spanish mercury soon deepened Upper Peru's economic and social collapse.
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·" See J.E. de Ezcurra to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.V1.1800, AGN, VII, 7-4-3 -2. J.J.C. de Anchorena to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.1.1802, AGN, VII, 7-4-1 -4: "Esta ruina -como Vm. opinaba -la ha causado el contrabando, porque si este no se hubiera cometido, no hubiera habido la cantidad de efectos y dependencias que los está devozando, no hubieran habido decomisos que han perjudicado a los que tenían algunos fondos en manos ajenas, y perjudicaron a las negociaciones de Europa y han arruinado la América con la extracción de caudales".
45 See J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.11.1797, AGN, Vil, 7 -4-3-2. J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.X.I797, AGN, VII, 7 -4-3-2: "Aquí.. .todos creen inmediatas las pazes, y así el que tenía ánimo de comprar una capa, pasa con la que tiene, y se persuade comprarla más barata de los géneros de paz...". J.E. de Ezcurra to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.IX.1798, AGN, VII, 7-4-3 -2: ".. .parece que los enredos de Europa han de durar, esta esperanza me ha sujetado a pedir a ésa cosa de 10.000 pesos de efectos a suerte y ventura esperanzado en que antes que vengan las paces los he de concluir bien...". J. de Obregón Zevallos to J,E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.XII.1798, AGN, VII, 7-4-3-2. J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VII.1800, AGN, VII, 7-4-1-6: "Este perjuicio acabó de arruinar al Péru, pues como Vd. sabe, no tiene esta villa otra subsistencia, ni entrada, que el trabajo del cerro, de modo, que en parando los ingenios se despoblará la villa, y se inundará más de ladrones, que apenas se podrá salir a la calle de día, pues, cuando ha llegado ya en otra ocasión a parar la rivera por cinco o seis semanas, por falta de agua, han sido muy graves los perjuicios que se experimentaron, ¿qué sería ahora con una parada, si Dios no lo remedia, sin término ni esperanza?".
Ruprecht Puensgen

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE HISPANIC TRADING SYSTEM
Studying the correspondence of Anchorena one notes a certain contradiction: Confronted on the one hand with an almost persistent lament about the commercial situation, on the other hand one nevertheless perceives that there always was considerable business going on. Indeed, the frequently deplored "total inaction" of La Plata's internal trade was a fact, especially for those merchants who, like Anchorena, had built up their fortune on the trade with the metropolis. As this article has shown, the 1790s experienced not only the depression of the Hispanic trade but furthermore the breakdown of its underlying trading system. Considering the comercio libre of 1778 as an attempt by the mother-country to reform its trade within the existing trading system, i.e., to open trade within its empire while conserving its monopolistic nature, the 1790s should be understood as a crucial turning point, changing the inherent structure of commerce in the Río de la Plata. Beginning with the liberalization of La Plata's trade during the 1790s, foreign merchants had begun to dominate the trade of the viceroyalty. From then on, the exclusivist nature of the Hispanic trade was never restored, a crucial factor in its ruin two decades later.
4^
One may judge this transformation of La Plata's commerce at the end of the eighteenth century less as a structural change from monopolistic Hispanic trade to international free trade (or non-Hispanic monopolistic trade) but rather more as a restoration of La Plata's traditional commercial character, 47 Nonetheless, focusing on the second half of the eighteenth century, the period of La Plata's economic boom and Anchorena's and so many other merchants' careers, this research suggests the 1790s' importance as a turning point. The transformation of La Plata's commerce and its consequent economic and political tensions within Buenos Aires' merchant community can be seen through the debates of the consulado. In fact, the discussions of the consulado reveal a virtual division of the porteño merchants 48 Belgrano, secretary of the consulado, was a spokeman for the progressive minded merchant group: "¡Ah!, Señores, es preciso confesar que el mal ha estado y está en nosotros mismos, y que los pudientes no han hecho más que el comercio de Europa... sin atender otros ramos ni mirar que la tierra bien o mal empleada, el cultivo bien o mal dirigido deciden de la riqueza o la indigencia no sólo de los labradores, sino también en general en todas las clases de un estado en que el comercio y el bien real dependen esencialmente de las producciones de la tierra. Ya es preciso que despertemos de este letargo...", cit. por Ruben H. Zorrilla, Cambio social y población en el pensamiento de Mayo (1810 Mayo ( -1830 (Buenos Aires 1978), p.64. 49 See for example the position of González de Volaños; AGN, Consulado, IH, pp. 293 -295. 50 ".. .las escaseses que se expresan padecen estas Provincias de efectos de Europa sin señarla sus especies no reconosco en el día haya falta en esta de algunos de absoluta necesidad [...] por el costo caro de algún genero que se venda ó exija si hay precision, no es carencia, y para la substentacion los de Lujo, en todo tiempo que no abunden suben sus precios, pues para la geme de poco caudal y servicio, no solamente no escasea la ropa de la tierra de colores (que ha bajado de precio en estos meses) Liensos razonables de algodon del Perú que han venido y vienen muchos miles de piezas del Valle de Catamarca, Paraguay y Misiones fuera de los que aqui se fabrican, sino que sobran para abrigar las gentes de trabajo", Ibidem.
51 J.A. de Arrangoiz to J.E. de Anchorena, Santander, 9.V1I1.1793, AGN, Vil, 7-4 -1 -2: "Aunque se haya retirado del comercio de cueros, debe Vra. recibirlo pues es el modo de que con menos trabajo saque muchas utilidades. Sin otro tráfico para España que el de cueros (...) con destino a este dicho puerto precisamente; se ha de hacer Vm. rico...". over the frequent cooperation between the viceroyalty's administration and his commercial adversaries.
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Some merchants of the Hispanic commercial sector like Anchorena did not simply deny the viceroyalty's need to import European merchandise through foreign merchants. Their central argument was based on their vision of a common link of economic interests within the Spanish Empire. Thus they spoke of an indissoluble "national" economic union and a total identification of interests between the viceroyalty and the mother-country. The liberalization of the export of hides, they argued, only could be considered as "an unreparable prejudice of the public funds, the national commerce, and the state in general".
53 Anchorena believed that a continuation of the unchanged comercio de negros would be "a universal detriment to the national commerce of all subjects in America and Europe". 54 In 1798, Anchorena became so alarmed by the consequences of the growing influence of the foreign merchants that he predicted a worst case scenario: a continuing direct trade with foreigners would not only ruin the Spanish trade but furthermore reduce Spain and America to poverty.
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To be sure, the advocates and beneficiaries of liberalization also claimed to represent the real interests of the Spanish crown and the viceroyalty. But in opposition to Anchorena they did not claim any direct link to other Hispanic merchants: "We are not the agents of the commerce of Cádiz, Lima, or Havana", proclaimed one merchant in 1797, denying those merchants oriented toward Spain the right to see themselves as the legitimate representatives of the national or domestic commerce. 56 Moreover, if Anchorena and his colleagues were not willing to sacrifice their particular concerns for the public interest, they would soon meet some other kind of resistance.
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The debates of the consulado serve to show the high degree of division which existed within the merchant community of Buenos Aires during the 1790s. The debates demonstrate as well how extreme, distressful, and hopeless Anchorena's economic situation was. To be sure, Anchorena did not stand alone; he represented an entire group of merchants. The story of Anchorena's engagement in the consulado also includes something of a bitter irony. He had contributed to its establishment, he had served the city's merchant community as its first counsul, but he left the consulado in 1799 in anger and personal defeat. Leaving his office, his agents and friends congratulated him. A time of "intrigues", and "annoyances" finally was over.
58 It was not just Anchorena's personal defeat; it was the defeat of all merchants oriented toward the metropolis.
A last comment with regard to Anchorena's trade: the correspondence indicates clearly that his agents in Upper Peru in spite of their complaints undertook profitable business. They managed to sell goods at 15 to 25 % over the purchase price. average profit margin of 5 to 10 %. 60 If this profit margin compared to former times seems small, it nonetheless proves that there still were some deals to be made. In fact, this was exactly the conclusion that Juan José Cristóbal de Anchorena arrived at observing the Upper Peruvian economy for some eighteen months. It is telling that the young Anchorena criticized the commercial strategy of the Obregón Zevallos and other more traditional merchants. Obregón Zevallos could have earned a great deal of money, argued Anchorena, if he had only been disposed to accept smaller profit margins. "But he is one of those", he continued in a letter to his father, "who aspire to at least 25% profit which for Peru is a very bad matter, because here the best way to trade consists in buying for 10 and selling for 12". Indeed, Upper Peru still could be a "paradise" even if it has become a "paradise without flowers" as Juan José Cristóbal wrote to his younger brother. 61 According to the younger Anchorena, the essential problem was the merchants' inability to adapt themselves to the new conditions.
THE LACK OF COMMUNICATION
The correspondence of Anchorena shows another phenomenon of the crisis at the late 18th century: the increasing difficulties of the merchants on both sides of the Atlantic in maintaining regular communication among themselves. Successful trade essentially depended on the merchants' ability to profit from favorable market conditions in Spain and the viceroyalty. But to engage in business through linking the markets at an optimal moment, they had to have exact information on the general situation and local trends. Anchorena and his agents in the Río de la Plata and in the mother-country needed to be prepared to react fast if economic and political events or developments made it necessary. Moreover, in a time of turbulent change, growing confusion, and spreading rumor, the merchants needed to be provided with dependable news. Thus both the head of the commercial house in Buenos Aires and the merchants abroad, depended on a constant and reliable exchange of information. In fact, like the trade itself, the normal flow of information within the Spanish Empire was frequently interrupted daring the 1790s. Occasionally, no trading vessel or Spanish warship (navios de aviso) arrived at Buenos Aires for months, and Anchorena and his agents in the interior were left without any information. To be sure, the lack of news caused by an English blockade of the Río de la Plata affected everybody in the same way, including the crown's representative. In normal times, a letter sent from Buenos Aires to Cádiz needed approximately six weeks, an exchange of letters between both ports three months. But during the last decade of the eighteenth century Anchorena could wait up to ten months for a reply from Cádiz. Without doubt, the crisis of communication would only enter its full stage during the first decade of the following century when the interruption of the Atlantic navigation was combined with military conflicts on the territories of Spain and La Plata itself. But increasing isolation contributed even during the 1790s to disturb Anchorena. 
THE CORRUPTION OF MORALS
Many merchants like Anchorena experienced the 1790s as a period of growing moral decline. In a time of a fast changing local and global environment, their vision of the world was constantly questioned. They might embrace or refuse the new economic and political thinking, they might be delighted by or indignant with the new developments in the Old and the New World, the vision of their world, their mentality, had changed. Río de la Plata via Spain. No matter how senseless these new ideas are, he commented in 1790, the porteños would exalt them to their fashion, and "the fashion of this time is a perversion and confusion of the senses". Anchorena was particularly scandalized about the situation of his native country. Two and a half years after his own journey to Spain, his brother in Pamplona sent him a discouraging description of the moral attitudes of his compatriots. Juan Esteban de Anchorena had made his career in America and he certainly did consider Buenos Aires his home. But at the same time he was a Spaniard and doubtless he always identified himself with Spain's history and culture. He felt irritated and indignant about changes in the metropolis. Apparently, Anchorena saw a direct connection between Spain's economic and political crisis and the moral decay of its society. Moreover, he believed the mother-country's troubles to be a result of its decadence. When sending his oldest son to Spain for business in 1803, Anchorena told him that he would be confronted by its moral decline. To be sure, Anchorena's concern about the character of his compatriots was not limited to Spain. As the economic crisis began to affect the Rio de la Plata, he became distrustful too of Spaniards in Upper Peru. Thus he warned his son in 1798: "It seems that the Spaniards devote themselves on purpose to horrible vices and infamies". And, according to Anchorena, the corruption of morals was not a matter of people's regional or social origin. In 1790 he deplored the idleness and vices of poor people living in the hinterland of Buenos Aires. He maintained that its fertility and abundance of livestock spoiled their character. -4-1: ".. .todo se pone aquí al uso de España sin que haya desalino a que no le den el carácter de moda, y corno ésta no es lo que significa nuestro diccionario, no lo entiendo y sí estoy pensando que la moda de este tiempo es perversión o confusión del sentido. Dios nos libre de esto...". J.J. de Anchorena to J.E. de Anchorena, Pamplona, 23.Vil. 1790, AGN, VII, 7-4-1 -2: ".., estamos en un tiempo, que no se piensa sino en engañar, por no estar sujetos al trabajo...". J.E. de Anchorena to J.J.C, de Anchorena, Buenos Aires, 26.VII.1798, AGN, VII, 7-4-2-6: "y así, Juan Joseph, el principal mayorazgo temporal es la honra que se adquiere y sostiene con las buenas operaciones.. .ni dejes de leer buenos libros para recordarlos, con lo que conseguirás los mejores bienes temporales..J.E. de Anchorena a J.J.C. de Anchorena, Buenos Aires, 29.X.1803, AGN, VII, 7-4-3-4: ".. .ahora las mentiras y tramoyas que se oyen, te aconsejo que no apoyes y con prudencia si las oyes disimules porque me parece están muy corrompidos los sentidos de las gentes... en España si Dios te concede la feliz advertencia reconocerás bastante grosería.. .por eso te propuse tu viaje para que adquierieses conocimiento...". M.J. Pérez to J.E, de Anchorena, La Coruna, 15.XII.1790, AGN, VII, 7-4-1-5.
The corruption of morals were viewed by the merchants in particular as a decay of the Christian faith. It was the decline in piety, the lack of fear of doomsday which allowed people to loose their integrity. When Obregón Zevallos heard about the fraud involving Pedro de Altolaguirre, late treasurer of Potosí's Real Casa de Moneda, he was enraged. "I do not doubt", he wrote to Anchorena, "there will be very few who will be saved, [and] only among those of us, we who are Roman Catholic Christians". According to the merchant, people not only failed to act in a proper Christian way, they had begun to embrace new fashions like "atheism".
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It is difficult to judge the merchants' notion of Christianity during the 1790s without taking a closer look at their religious view during former times. Nonetheless, their special emphasis and interpretation of Christian dogma at the end of the eighteenth century were important. Within their belief, God as the Creator of heaven and earth was the master of all matters. The Lord as the judge of mankind ruled the world: His will determined all temporal affairs. He decided the fortune of people and nations, and he was the one who ruled over peace and war. If the world was full of sorrow and pain, if the wars, the revolutions, and the economic depression did not cease, then it was because of the Lord's punishing hand. And why did God send so much mischief to his people? Because they had committed so many sins. As a matter of fact, the merchants used this argument in their letters constantly. As they denounced the failing Spanish navy, the interruption of the Atlantic trade, or the decreasing supply of Spanish mercury, they always referred to "our sins". Juan José Cristobal de Anchorena had the same conviction: Europe's disastrous condition was punishment for "our innumerable offences", because "we do not believe in the immortality of our souls and in a creator who, knowing all, will judge things as they are". The world around the merchants had become dark and their own economic situation had turned wretched, but this vision of sin and punishment allowed the merchants to understand their world. With the help of their notion of Christianity they found an explanation for Spain's and their own misery. No wonder that Juan José Cristóbal de Anchorena eventually would trace the course of his business back to the will of God.
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It is almost impossible to judge if the constant recourse to 'terrestrial calamity-God's punishment-people's sins' was mere rhetoric or the reflection of a deep religious concern. Such a conclusion would require a broader study of the merchants' religious behavior and a more detailed investigation of their business affairs. In our much more limited context it is significant that the traders frequently expressed apocalyptical views through their correspondence. Over and over again they mentioned in their letters the coming Last Judgement. The merchants were sure, heaven would await "good Catholics", and hell would await sinners. In a time of political, economic, and cultural change, Anchorena and his agents desperately tried to hold fast to their traditional Christian faith. Having lost so much ground, they did not want to lose their religion. To be sure, when Obregón Zevallos cried "every man for his soul!", it was not the world itself but Anchorena's and his agents' world which was close to collapse.
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66 See Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.IX.1799, AGN, VII, 7-4-3-2: ".. .conceptúo lo dilatado de la guerra presente, pues no se trasluce vislumbre alguna de su cesación, Dios lo remedie todo, pues sólo Su Majestad Santísima es el que todo lo gobierna y dispone". J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VIII.1797, AGN, VII, 7-4-3-2: "...me he impuesto de lo ocurrido por parte de nuestra marina.. .y firmemente creo, que nuestros pecados son la causa de todos nuestros males...". J.J.C, de Anchorena to J E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VII.1798, AGN, VII, 7 -4-2-6; and J.J.C, de Anchorena to R.J. López de Anaya, Cádiz. 12.VI.1809, AGN, VII, 7-4-2-4; "El hombre debe poner los medios, el resultado favorable o adverso no está en sus manos...".
67 See R.Saravia to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VII.1798, AGN, VII, 7-4-3-1. Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, 26.VI.1800, AGN, VII, 7-4-1-6: ".. .sin ser profeta, [a Pedro Andrés García] le pronostico una eternidad de infierno, porque según las máximas de nuestra religión, según es la vida, es la muerte, y sabemos por la fe, que el que no se enmienda en esta vida, y no hace penitencia, la hará en la eternidad muy dura, e infructuosa". R.Saravia to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.III.1798; AGN, VII, 7 -4-3-1: "Las cosas de Europa nada favorables nos son, como la comprensión de Vd. dicen sólo debemos pedir a Dios la estabilidad en nuestra Religión y acierto para morir como cristianos en nuestros dogmas." Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VII.1800, AGN, VII, 7-4-1-6: "...me parece, si no me engaño, no queremos de corazón ocurrir a la fuente de misericordias, que es Dios nuestro Señor, sino seguir con arreglo al mundo y la moda que siempre ha sido contraría a nuestro Señor Jesuchristo: Yo no diviso otro remedio, sino el que cada uno tire a salvar su alma, entregándose del todo en manos de la divina providencia, y corran las cosas como quisieren, pues no lo puede uno remediar, bajo la inteligencia de que ya poco podemos vivir".
CONCLUSION
Historiography generally agrees that the Spanish-American Revolutions were sparked by the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian peninsula and the breakdown of the Spanish Bourbon monarchy. There seems to be a broad consensus that none of the underlying factors of the Spanish-American Independence like the Enlightenment, the Bourbon Reforms, the creole-peninsular controversy, and the late colonial revolts and protests, or any combination of them, possessed sufficent dimension to cause the disintegration of the Spanish Empire. Nonetheless this review of the crisis at the late 18 th century and its effects on the commercial world of the Río de la Plata demonstrates the extremely unstable and weak situation of Spain and its consequent crisis of the colonial system two decades before the outbreak of the revolutions. Our review of the crisis of the 1790s also shows the high degree of perception and awareness about the crisis within the Spanish Empire, and the high level of consternation and anxiety within parts of the economic and social elite at La Plata.
It would be idle to speculate which course the history of the American colonies would have taken if in 1808 Napoleon had not attempted to eliminate Spain's sovereignty and authority. Nonetheless this article suggests that La Plata's movement for independence was not a product of an accident. Since the 1790s Spain had become the plaything of European power politics. Spain's political, economic, and military decay became evident for everybody within (and outside of) the Spanish Empire. Spain was no longer able to fulfill its role as a metropolis. In addition, beginning in the 1790s, the traditional Spanish system of a monopolistic trade ceased to exist. The La Plata area experienced a gradual structural transformation of its economy. Foreign merchants, livestock products, and the priority of a quantitative trade (cheap mass products, high volume, low profit margins) replaced Hispanic merchants, Upper Peruvian silver, and the priority of a qualitative trade (luxury articles, low volume, high profit margins). At the same time the porteño merchant community, a part of La Plata's economic, social, and political elite, divided into two groups. While one of the two groups welcomed economic change and took advantage of its consequent opportunities, the second refused any change in the traditional rules. The latter aspired to the restoration of the status quo ante. It was not willing or able to accommodate to the new circumstances. The more innovative group of the merchants increasingly defined La Plata's interests independently and in opposition to the mother-country. In contrast the more traditional group clung to the concept of an indissoluble union of interests between the colony and the metropolis. Both groups were motivated by their own interests. For the merchants who had built their career and their fortunes on an exclusive trade with Spain, the 1790s produced an intensification of a structural economic crisis. This crisis had begun in the 1780s and would culminate in the first decade of the nineteenth century. The merchant group oriented toward Spain perceived the crisis at the late 18th century as an all-embracing crisis which affected all areas of politics, economics, and culture.
68 At first these merchants experienced an irritation and increasingly a breakdown of their traditional concept of Spanish and European politics. Confronted with the decline of Spain's power, the questioning of the traditional political and social orders by the revolutions in the Old and New World, and the menace to their own dominant position in La Plata's economy and society, the merchants reacted by resorting to their conservative-Catholic vision of the world. They interpreted the loss of their own world as an approaching apocalypse.
The crisis of the 1790s was a part of a major crisis of Spain's colonial system. It prepared the soil for La Plata's May Revolution. The crisis explains why by 1810 part of Buenos Aires' elite was ready to seize the moment to realize their ideas and interests independently from Spain. The crisis of the Spanish colonial system explains as well why another part of the Buenos Aires' elite put up so little resistance to the revolution. The two last decades of the Spanish colonial regime weakened the reforms of Charles III, reforms which had elevated Buenos Aires to the political and economic center of southern Spanish America. Because of the new reality, because of Rio de la Plata's political and economical transformation at the turn of the nineteenth century, the traditionally minded merchants generally behaved during the crucial years of 1808-10 in a passive and defensive way. While some merchants were able to accommodate themselves to new conditions (Juan José Cristóbal de Anchorena and his brothers), others abandoned Argentina (Juan Esteban de Ezcurra). Because of the ** In this consisted the very specific character of the crisis of the 1790s compared to the frecuent commercial crisis which, caused by the international wars, frecuently affected Buenos Aires during the whole 18th century, see E. Saguier, "La crisis de circulación", 
